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Although the overall shipyard workload has
decreased, material inventories at naval shipyards have
grown significantly in recent years. Inventories at
the eight naval shipyards increased 63 percent
(adjusted for inflation) between 1979 and 1983, and 24
percent between 1984 and 1987. Little action has been
taken to reverse this trend even though the problem has
been the subject of numerous studies since 1978.
This thesis examines existing inventory management
policies at naval shipyards. An evaluation of the
efficiency of existing policies for obtaining and
excessing materials was emphasized, and recommendations
for improvement were provided. Results indicate that
changes can be implemented that would decrease the
quantity of material ordered and excessed without
creating overhaul and repair delays. Such action would




A. NAVAL SHIPYARD MISSION 3
B. NAVY INDUSTRIAL FUND 4
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 8




A. MAINTENANCE PHILOSOPHY 12
B. COST AND SCHEDULE CONTROL 14
C. INVENTORY MANAGEMENT 19
D. INVENTORY COSTS 27
E. SUMMARY 31
III. PREVIOUS STUDIES 34
A. GOVERNMENT REVIEW 34
B. INDEPENDENT REVIEW 45
C. SUMMARY 49
IV. METHODOLOGY 51
V. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 53
A. OVERVIEW 53
B. DIRECT MATERIAL INVENTORY 61
C. SHOP STORES INVENTORY 64
D. UNASSIGNED DIRECT MATERIAL INVENTORY 68
iv
E. OPTIMAL INVENTORY LEVELS 74
F. SUMMARY 91
VI. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 94
A. SUMMARY 94
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 98
C. FURTHER RESEARCH 103
LIST OF REFERENCES 106
APPENDIX: LIST OF ACRONYMS 108
BIBLIOGRAPHY 1 09
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 110
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance
and guidance provided by Mr. W. W. (Bill) Scott of
Charleston Naval Shipyard. His willingness to provide
background literature and data, as well as discuss the
issues presented in this study, were a significant
contribution to the completion of this work.
VI
I. INTRODUCTION
For many years, the major objective of naval
shipyards has been to complete ship overhauls and
repairs on-time or early, with the dollar costs of such
repair work being a secondary consideration. Most
inventory management issues are reduced to ensuring
that sufficient material is on-hand for production
support. Zero stockouts are assumed. The costs
attributed to overhaul are considered to exceed all
other costs, including the cost of investing in and
holding inventory.
An extension of this maintenance philosophy
required that shipyards obtain 100 percent of the
material required to support repair or overhaul work on
specific vessels prior to a ship's arrival [Ref. 1:
para. 4.1.1]. Material requirements are based on
expected or planned overhaul work, and under existing
Naval Sea System Command (NAVSEA) disposal policies,
the material must be retained in inventory, identified
to a specific customer job order, until that job order
is formally completed [Ref. 2: p. 6-7-22]. As a
result, material is often ordered and held in inventory
to support future work when identical material exists
in inventory.
Shipyards additionally lack a definitive policy
which contributes to the adjustment of inventory levels
and mix based on workload changes. As ship types and
type of repair change over time, existing inventory
stocks are not readily purged of obsolete material
items. This "lost" inventory investment further
increases holding costs and prevents the diversion of
this material to alternative uses in other shipyards,
or for operational support.
Numerous players are involved in the material
management process at naval shipyards: the planning
department identifies the material needs; the supply
department obtains, holds, and issues the material; and
the production department is the ultimate user. For
the most part, this organization fails to integrate the
inventory management effort to coordinate the process,
which would potentially result in the release of
material to other uses in a timely manner.
These issues have contributed to a significant
increase in inventory levels at naval shipyards in
recent years. Considering the existing fiscal
limitations being experienced throughout the Department
of Defense ( DOD ) and government, policies and actions
are necessary which will reduce the future financial
and managerial investment in inventory at naval
shipyards
.
A. NAVAL SHIPYARD MISSION
The Naval Sea Systems Command has the overall
responsibility for the maintenance of Navy ships. As
such, it has assigned the following tasks and functions
to the eight existing naval shipyards:
1
.
Providing logistic support to activities and
units of the Operating Forces of the U. S. Navy
and naval shore (field) activities, as assigned
by competent authority.
2. Performing authorized shipwork in connection with
the construction, conversion, overhaul, repair,
alteration, activation, inactivation and
outfitting of naval ships and service craft.
3. Performing authorized repairables work in
connection with repair, restoration, refit,
refurbishment and overhaul of systems,
equipments, components and modules as scheduled.
4. Designing naval ships, when so designated.
5. Operating as planning yard for ship alterations
and preparing allowance lists for ships under
construction and conversion in accordance with
instructions issued by the Naval Sea Systems
Command.
6. Performing research, development, test and
evaluation work, as assigned.
7. Serving as stock point for designated material,
as assigned.
8. Providing accounting, civil payroll, savings
bond, public works, industrial relations,
medical, dental, berthing, messing, fire
prevention and fire protection, security and
other services to naval shore (field) activities
and other government agencies, as assigned.
9. Performing manufacturing, as assigned.
10. Accomplishing shore-electronics work; as
requested by the Naval Electronic Systems
Command.
11. Preparing and maintaining development, logistic
support, disaster control and other plans, as
assigned.
12. Performing work for other U.S. Government
Departments, private parties and foreign
governments, as directed by competent authority.
[Ref. 3: p. ii]
All tasks and functions described above are not
necessarily applicable to each naval shipyard. The
relative applicability depends on the assigned
maintenance capabilities of the individual shipyard.
For example, all naval shipyards have the capability to
perform maintenance work on conventionally powered
ships, and specific shipyards have been additionally
assigned unique maintenance capabilities, such as the
repair of nuclear-powered surface ships (see Table 1).
Ship overhaul and repair work are also conducted at
numerous private shipyards both within and outside the
continental United States. This work is monitored by
assigned Supervisors of Shipbuilding that ensure
contract compliance and quality of work. Although the
missions of private shipyards are often similar to the
missions of naval shipyards, their specific activities
are beyond the scope of this study.
B. NAVY INDUSTRIAL FUND
The Navy Industrial Fund (NIF) finances industrial
and commercial activities that produce or furnish goods
or render services to other activities on a
TABLE 1
























^No nuclear maintenance capability.
^Also makes emergency repairs to all ships in the
Pacific and overhauls all ships homeported in
Hawaii
.
Source: United States General Accounting Office Report,
Reductions in the Civilian Work Force at Naval
Shipyards
, November 1986.
reimbursable basis [Ref.4: p. H-1]. As such, the NIF
provides the working capital necessary to finance
shipyard operations, including shipyard material
inventories. At present, naval shipyards bid for
certain types of overhaul and repair work in
competition with commercial activities, using the NIF
to finance all costs required to support work awarded.
All work performed is documented on individual job
orders which also include allowances for overhead
costs. The shipyard is reimbursed by the customers'
expendable maintenance funds based on periodic (at
least monthly) billings as jobs are completed and work
is verified as acceptable by customers. Figure 1
demonstrates how job order costs are determined and
billed to customers. DOD Directive 7410.4 specifies
that customers of an industrial fund activity may be:
1. Operating force commands, or mission units
thereof, operation agencies, commodity commands,
inventory control points, weapons system or
project managers or any Department of Defense
components having missions and responsibilities
separate from management and operation of the
industrial fund activity;
2. Military personnel, private individuals and
concerns and other government agencies as
authorized. [Ref . 4]
Material costs are typically reimbursed at actual cost
regardless of the billing method used.
Industrial fund accounting is designed to serve as
a management tool which provides for the strict
accounting of costs incurred in ship repair. Standard
cost accounting practices are used, including variance
analysis, in an effort to improve the efficiency and
effectiveness of the industrial fund activity.
Industrial Funds are designed to:
1 . Provide a more effective means for controlling
the costs of goods and services required to be




























Figure 1 Job Order Costs Under Navy Industrial Fund
commercial type activities and a more effective
and flexible means for financing, budgeting and
accounting for the costs thereof;
Create and recognize contractual relationships
between industrial and commercial type activities
and those activities which budget for and order
the end product or services, in order to provide
management advantages and incentives for
efficiency and economy;
Provide to managers of industrial and commercial
activities the financial authority and
flexibility required to procure and use manpower,
materials and other resources effectively;
Encourage more cross-servicing among the military
departments and among their operating agencies,
with the aim of obtaining more economical use of
facilities
;
5. Support the performance budgeting concept by
facilitating budgeting and reporting for the
costs of end products, and thus underlining the
cost consequences of decision making, including
choices between alternatives in such items. [Ref.
5: para. V]
As the efficiency of the industrial fund activity
improves, the cost per unit of the services provided by
the activity decrease. This results in lower costs for
the customer, which in turn reduces fleet operating
costs. Inefficiencies in industrial fund operations in
the early 1980s was evidenced by increased reliance on
civilian contractors for less expensive ship repair
work. This situation has changed in the past few
years, however, with Navy activities being awarded
increasing amounts of work. In this instance, as in
many others throughout government, the addition of
competition for ship repair contracts has forced
shipyards to monitor costs more closely, and take
positive action to reduce costs as much as possible.
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
This thesis will attempt to identify the causes of
inventory growth at naval shipyards, as well as
identify potential material procurement and inventory
management alternatives which will reduce the future
investment in shipyard inventories. Recommendations
for change will be consistent with the overall
maintenance objectives of naval shipyards, considering
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the goal to complete overhaul and repair work within
the scheduled time at minimum cost.
D. SCOPE OF THE STUDY
This thesis will concentrate on current efforts at
naval shipyards and at Naval Sea Systems Command to
identify inventory growth problems. Management policy
actions previously taken to restrict or reduce the size
of inventory, as well as actions planned in the future,
will also be included. Alternatives not previously
considered will be proposed and evaluated.
E. LIMITATIONS
The inventory management problems in existence at
naval shipyards are representative of the inventory
management problems being experienced throughout DOD.
This thesis is not, however, intended as a study of DOD
inventory management policies due to the scope and time
limitations that exist for this thesis. Naval
shipyards were selected for study due to the
availability of data and the perceptions of the author
that a valid study could be conducted within both the
time and financial constraints which impact upon the
conduct of this work. The recommendations for change
resulting from this study will hopefully provide
workable alternatives to a well known, complex problem.
F. ORGANIZATION
Chapter I introduces the missions of naval
shipyards and describes how shipyard operations are
financed by the Navy Industrial Fund. Also included is
a description of shipyard job order cost determination
and a discussion of the manner in which the Navy
Industrial Fund is ultimately reimbursed, by the
customer, for the services provided. The objectives,
scope, limitations and organization of this study are
also presented.
Chapter II addresses the maintenance philosophy of
naval shipyards as well as the manner in which overhaul
and repair schedules are created and costs controlled.
In addition, the major categories of shipyard
inventories are identified, including the procedures
used to procure and manage material. The various
factors which contribute to inventory costs are also
discussed.
The tremendous growth in inventory at naval
shipyards, and within the Department of Defense, has
been the subject of several independent studies. These
studies, conducted by the U.S. General Accounting
Office and the accounting firm Coopers & Lybrand, are
consistent in the identification of the magnitude and
causes of the problem. The results of these studies
are addressed in detail in Chapter III.
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Chapter IV addresses the methodology used for the
conduct of this study. Included is a discussion of the
types of data obtained, the sources of this data and
the extent to which the various types of data were
relied upon.
Chapter V contains data which identifies the
shipyard inventory growth on a yearly basis for the
five years ending in 1987. This data includes total
inventory value, inventory as a percent of operating
costs, days inventory on-hand, direct material as a
percent of direct cost, direct material charged per
direct manhour and direct material reject rates. This
data is presented to demonstrate the various elements
that are included in the inventory management process
at naval shipyards. Alternatives to improve the
management of inventory are discussed and include
current initiatives being implemented at shipyards
which are intended to reduce the investment in
inventory
.
The final chapter summarizes the results of this
study and offers specific recommendations for reducing




As stated in the Introduction, naval shipyards
historically operated with the primary goal to complete
ship overhauls and repairs on-time or early. As a
result, extensive overhaul pre-planning was performed
which included the early ordering of all material
required to support the repair work. Ship overhauls
are extremely labor intensive, and in an attempt to
complete the work as early as possible, schedules were
reduced and large amounts of overtime labor was devoted
to the overhaul project. As might be expected, this
resulted in high overhaul costs which were primarily
borne by the customer, the operating forces. This cost
was never considered excessive, however, because the
implied cost (exact dollar estimate undetermined) of
being without the operational ship with respect to
fleet readiness and national defense was always deemed
to exceed any cost incurred for overhaul or repair.
However, as budget deficits skyrocketed in the
early-to-mid 1980s, overhaul costs gained increased
attention in Congress and the media. This attention,
combined with a decline in private shipyard business,
brought increased congressional requests for ship
12
repair at private shipyards. This situation resulted
in the initiation of competitive bidding between
private and public shipyards for overhaul work. And
although both activities were forced to reduce costs,
naval shipyards initially experienced difficulty in
reducing costs to the extent required to receive
contract awards. Fortunately, this trend has changed
and now private shipyards are finding it increasingly
difficult to compete with naval shipyards, particularly
with respect to work on nuclear powered vessels.
Several factors contributed to the naval shipyards'
ability to reduce costs. The first of these,
congressionally mandated competition, was extremely
successful as discussed in the preceding paragraph. A
second initiative involves a revised maintenance
philosophy which extends the periods between overhauls
for certain classes of ships and eliminates overhauls
for other classes of ships. Extended operating cycles
have been made possible primarily through the
construction of propulsion plants and equipment that
are more easily maintained through routine, periodic
maintenance. Additionally, overhauls have been reduced
through the implementation of frequent, short-term (2
to 4 month) maintenance periods throughout the life of
certain ship classes. These short-term maintenance
periods are used to either sustain the material
13
condition of a ship "between overhauls (selected
restricted availability) or to accomplish maintenance
in segments over a series of shipyard visits (phased
maintenance availability) [Ref. 6: p. 11]. Ships
assigned to selected restricted availabilities ( SRAs
)
are enabled to operate longer between overhauls, and
ships assigned to phased maintenance availabilities
often forego overhaul altogether.
According to a 1986 General Accounting Office ( GAO
report
:
By 1982, the Navy had placed nine classes of surface
combatant ships on extended operating cycles. For
some of these, the period between overhauls was
extended from 37 to 60 months; according to a
shipyard official, in 1984 the time between overhauls
for some of the others was extended from about 4-0 to
60 months or more. The official also said that in
1986 the Navy removed 88 of these ships from the
overhaul schedule for fiscal year 1987 and beyond and
that the Navy intends to do only short-term
maintenance to keep the ships in operation until they
become obsolete. [Ref. 6: p. 11]
This change in maintenance philosophy has resulted in
extended ship operating cycles, uniform shipyard
workloads, a reduction in the shipyard labor force and
lower costs through greater economy and efficiency.
B. COST AND SCHEDULE CONTROL
Ships designated for overhaul or repair are
typically assigned to particular shipyards between 12
and 18 months prior to the scheduled start of overhaul.
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Once this assignment is made, maintenance personnel
from the ship's Type Commander (TYCOM), for example
Commander Submarine Force U.S. Atlantic Fleet
( COMSUBLANT ) , begin working with the planning
department of the assigned shipyard to define the
specific work desired during the designated maintenance
period. The result of this effort is numerous work
packages which define, by ship system, the overall work
effort required. Work packages are reduced to Job
orders which describe in detail the work to be
performed and serve as a means for documenting
maintenance costs. Each Job order identifies the
material required to support Job completion and is used
by the planning department in the preparation of Job
Material Lists (JMLs). These JMLs are subsequently
submitted to the shipyard supply department for
material requisitioning, with the goal of obtaining all
required materials prior to the scheduled start of
work. As might be expected, this goal is often
difficult to attain.
Job orders also serve to identify individual work
elements to overhaul key events. A key event is a
designated point in the overall sequence of work which
the shipyard or higher authority has determined to be a
significant milestone for timely work completion. Key
events typically define the critical path of the
15
overhaul process, and as such are monitored closely by
everyone concerned with overhaul progress. Although
several hundred such events are usually defined for
purposes of work status determination, those depicted
in Figure 2 are the most significant key events for a
nuclear powered submarine overhaul. The time period
indicated represents the number of months after ship




equipment removal Drydock Undock
> >-/
months >
Engineroom Hot Reactor plant Sea Complete
steaming operations critical trials overhaul
/ > > > > >
11 12 14 16 17
Figure 2. Submarine Overhaul Key Events
It is during the time period depicted in Figure 2
that the majority of material is drawn from inventory
by the production department and transferred to the
shipyard work-in-process (WIP) account for that ship.
When used properly, the job order serves as a
management tool that permits work supervisors to ensure
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that all material is on-hand prior to the beginning of
work. If the required material is not on-hand, the
production department notifies the supply department
that material expediting action is required. In
addition, previously unidentified (emergent) material
requirements are identified throughout the overhaul and
requisitioning action initiated as necessary.
Four interrelated management constraints similar to
those experienced in private industry must be
considered by shipyard management [Ref. 7: p. 19].
These are: available manpower, authorized work,
schedule adherence and estimated cost. With regard to
available manpower, the shipyard must determine the
number of personnel and the skills required based on
the forecasted workloads identified from the existing
work packages. Therefore, work packages must be well
written and defined to the maximum extent possible.
Insufficient manpower estimates will result in cost
increases due to either maintenance delays or
requirements for overtime labor.
The shipyard has little control over the second
constraint, authorized work [Ref. 8: p. 37]. Although
the shipyard provides input, work packages are
developed based on maintenance requirements determined
by higher authority, such as equipment modernizations
and changes directed by Naval Sea Systems Command. The
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shipyard input is limited to communications with the
ship's Type Commander and usually includes problems
identified during shipyard pre-overhaul inspections and
testing, or during overhauls of similar types of ships.
Early identification of previously unidentified
maintenance requirements is essential due to cost and
schedule impact.
Scheduling, and therefore schedule adherence, is
mandated "by the Chief of Naval Operations as
recommended by Naval Sea Systems Command based on U.S.
and North Atlantic Treaty Organization force
composition requirements [Ref. 8: p. 31]. Factors such
as the age and type of ship, ship operating cycle (time
elapsed since previous overhaul or repair), extent of
maintenance to be performed and typical shipyard
performance for maintenance in a certain ship-type all
determine the length of overhaul. When an overhaul is
completed on-time or early, the customer benefits
through the avoidance of work delays in other vessels,
the avoidance of increased costs which are ultimately
borne by the customer as well as the opportunity cost
avoided when the ship is returned to the operational
fleet. An efficient mix of resources is required,
however, which will minimize the dollar cost of the




The fourth management constraint, estimated cost,
has a direct relationship to authorized work. Future
costs are estimated on the basis of existing man-day
labor /overhead rates and estimated material costs.
Then, considering a fixed budget amount for overhaul
work, a priority work package is developed to remain
within the budget. The ship's crew often performs
minor work that will not be performed by the shipyard
in order to complete all work within the estimated
cost
.
In summary, the basic premise of cost and schedule
control is to complete the desired repair work in the
required time period at minimum cost. Control is
exercised through the development of work packages, job
orders and key event schedules which serve as the
foundation for defining manpower requirements and
determining cost estimates. Schedule adherence is
paramount to controlling costs due to the negative
impact on dollar costs and adverse delays in overhauls
or repairs of other ships.
C. INVENTORY MANAGEMENT
As discussed in the preceding section, shipyard
planning department personnel (planners and estimators)
determine direct material requirements based on
customer job orders. Required materials are recorded
on Job Material Lists which are then submitted to the
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supply department for requisitioning action. This is
the first and most important step for creating a
material commitment and requisition record.
Material commitments are for local management and are
not part of the official NIF accounts. While
material control begins with forecasting, planning,
material reservation, etc., based on demand and other
requirements information, records control at the Navy
Industrial Fund activities begins with specific
material ordering or commitment action, i.e., job
material list, bill of material document. With the
addition of material status and other in-depth
information, the requisition record has become an
important vehicle of control relative to the various
phases of material processing; i.e., material
availability, status follow-up, receipt delivery and
cost accounting. It has been determined that a
single requisition record is the most economical
means of recording the various data elements involved
in the material ordering process. [Ref. 2: para.
60703. A]
This material is usually placed on order shortly after
the need is identified, often 12 to 18 months prior to
the start of overhaul. Upon receipt, this material is
identified to the specific customer job order and
placed in the Direct Material Inventory (DMI) account
which is managed by the supply department.
DMI is material held in storage, earmarked for a
specific customer pending issuance to work-in-
process. The dollar value of this material is held
in the DMI account and not charged to the customer
until issued for installation or fabrication. DMI is
an inventory account used to provide accountability
for material between the time it is received from the
supply system or from outside sources and the time it
is used on the job. DMI is needed to keep material
costing in line with physical completion and to
20
eliminate, as far as possible, the customer being
charged for material which was not used on the job.
[Ref. 2: para. 60709. B.I]
This material is charged to the customer's job order
and to work-in-process when issued for use during the
overhaul. DMI material is issued to production shops
on the basis of a shop request. The production
department then becomes responsible for the material
until it is used on the job or returned to the supply
department as excess. DMI material is only to be drawn
when the need is known and when the material will be
used within 30 days after being drawn from inventory
[Ref. 2: para. 60709. C. 2].
The DMI account is screened upon completion of a
customer job order and prior to final billing. Any
unused material is assigned to another customer job
order if the material can potentially be used for that
job. If the material is required to fill a Shop Stores
requirement, then the material is transferred to the
Shop Stores Inventory account. In those instances
where the material cannot be assigned to either of
these accounts, and the planning department determines
a potential need for the material during the subsequent
24 months, then the material is assigned to the
Unassigned Direct Material (UDM) account, or returned
to the supply system if no further use is expected.
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The DMI account is the largest (in terms of dollar
value and number of line items) of the three inventory
accounts maintained "by the supply department. Physical
inventories are conducted when the shipyard Comptroller
determines that conditions require an inventory to be
taken. Existing inventory accuracy goals require that
DMI be at least 90 percent accurate in fiscal year (FY)
1988, 95 percent accurate in FY 1989 and 98 percent
accurate in FY 1990.
The Materials and Supplies Inventory, commonly
referred to as Shop Stores Inventory, is the second
major inventory account and consists of commonly used
material to support current manufacturing, repair,
maintenance and general use.
The primary purpose of the shop store is to
facilitate the issue of material which is needed for
current operations. Therefore, stock is specialized,
stock control and issue procedures are simplified,
and the store is operated by personnel familiar with
the material stocked. Material is stocked based on
recurring or forecasted demand and shop store items
may meet single customer requirements. [Ref . 2: para.
60706. A]
The supply department establishes and maintains stock
levels based on usage, safety stock requirements,
expected production and/or planning department
requirements and funding limitations. Stock levels are




A 90 day demand level of high volume/low cost
consumable Items such as office supplies, paint,
rags, etc.
2. A 1 50 day demand level of raw material such as
sheet steel, bar stock, etc.
3. A 180 day demand level of forecasted material to
support future production.
4. Seasonal bulk items such as coal, oil, etc.
[Ref. 2: para. 60706. D.I]
Standard U.S. Government stock material assigned
National Stock Numbers (NSNs) is required to be
utilized to the maximum extent practicable. In
addition, material co-located in both Shop Stores and
DMI should be consolidated and carried in the Shop
Stores Inventory based on historical demand. All
inactive Shop Stores items are returned to supply
system stock if in ready-for-issue (RFI) condition, or
disposed of if in not-ready-for-issue (NRFI) condition.
Physical inventories are required semi-annually.
Existing accuracy goals require that this account be at
least 75 percent accurate in FY 1988, 85 percent
accurate in FY 1989 and 90 percent accurate in FY 1990.
Unassigned Direct Material (UDM) Inventory is the
third major shipyard inventory account. As the name
implies, this inventory account consists primarily of
excess material formerly assigned to the DMI account.
This material is either excess to the required DMI
inventory levels or represents material returned
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(unused) but no longer required after completion of a
customer order. Such material is transferred to the
UDM account if there is a foreseeable need for that
material within the subsequent 24 months or if the
material historically requires a long procurement
leadtime. All new material orders are screened against
the UDM account, and transferred to DMI under a
requiring job order or to Shop Stores on the basis of
demand. Items remaining in the UDM account for longer
than two years are typically returned to supply system
stock or disposed of if obsolete. Physical inventories
of material assigned to the UDM account are required
annually. Inventory accuracy goals for this inventory
account are the same as those assigned to the DMI
account
.
In general, all shipyard material not charged to
work-in-process or pre-expended bins should be recorded
in one of the three inventory accounts described above.
Material excessing procedures are depicted in Figure 3
[Ref. 9: p. 19].
Shipyard inventories are identified to two material
categories: Navy Industrial Fund (NIF) material and
non-NIF material. The three inventory accounts


























Source: Corporate-Tech Planning, Inc., Material
Management System Supervisory Management
Course
,
prepared for Norfolk Naval Shipyard,
1985.
Figure 5. Excess Material Processing Procedures
NIF Material . NIF material consists of all
materials or supplies owned by a naval activity
operating under the industrial fund. Ownership
by NIF is considered analogous to material paid
for from NIF cash and material donated to
NIF.... NIF material may be physically located at
the NIF activity, a private contractor or other
similar location, or in an in-transit status with
location unknown. In any event, all NIF material
must be recorded in the NIF accounts: Material
and Supplies Active--Account 1421; Material and
Supplies Insurance--Account 1 422 ;... Direct
Mater ial--Account 1431; Unassigned Direct
Mater ial--Account 1432....
Non-NIF Material . Non-NIF material consists of
that material owned by the NIF activity's
customers, currently in the NIF activity's
custody, and is to be used in relation to work
performed by the NIF activity or ship's force.
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This includes Government Furnished Material...,
material financed by the customer ,.. .mater ial
purchased with customer funds that is excess upon
completion of a Job, awaiting disposition or
authorization by the customer to retain for
future use. [Ref. 2: para. 60701]
Naval shipyards record and control the procurement,
receipt, movement, inspection, storage, and issue of
material with the use of an on-line data processing
application known as Material Management (MM) [Ref. 9:
p. 17]. The MM subsystem is integrated into the
shipyard management information system (MIS) and serves
as a ready reference for information dealing with
shipyard material inventories. Data terminals are
located throughout the shipyard, including production
shops. Material availability and order status are
readily determined by entry of stock, requisition or
job order numbers. MM facilitates the management of
the shipyard inventory accounts.
The MM subsystem also aids in the identification of
excess material by creating excess materials listings
at the completion of overhaul work. These listings are
then reviewed by responsible personnel within the
production department for evaluation of any potential
future use for the material. Figure 3 demonstrates the
alternatives available to decision makers. MM also
collects historical material usage data for use by both
supply and planning department personnel.
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D. INVENTORY COSTS
Although most shipyard management data is directly
concerned with the dollar (cost) investment in
inventories, numerous other costs exist which must be
considered, as well as controlled, if the overall
inventory investment is to be reduced. Specifically,
the variable costs to order and hold individual items
must be minimized subject to the constraint that
required material will be on-hand when called for. The
cost attributed to not having material when required,
otherwise known as shortage or stockout cost, varies
depending on the significance of the particular item to
the task at hand. Actual shortage costs are difficult
to determine, and in practice are a function of the
average number of days forecast for delay in the
availability of material and the availability of funds
for inventory investments [Ref. 10: p. 2]. As a result
of this uncertainty, decisions relating to implied
shortage costs require a great deal of experienced
judgment. The cost of labor that remains idle due to
the lack of material is frequently used to determine
actual shortage cost for individual jobs.
Department of Defense Instruction 4140.59,
"Procurement Cycles and Safety Levels of Supply for
Secondary Items", establishes basic Department of
Defense policy for the minimization of total variable
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ordering and holding cost, subject to the constraint of
an implied shortage cost, for naval systems commands,
inventory control points and project managers [Ref. 10:
p. 1]. The concepts presented in this directive are
equally applicable to naval shipyards and are utilized
in the determination of economic order quantities for
individual items.
The cost to order an item of material is dependent
on the procurement method used. The cost to order
includes the cost to prepare and process the material
request as well as the cost devoted to processing the
material upon receipt and placing the material in the
appropriate warehouse location. The cost of ordering
material procured under purchase contract is usually
greater than the cost of ordering standard-stock
material due to the additional cost of contract
preparation and administration. Because fixed costs
are essentially uncontrollable, only those costs that
vary as a function of the number of orders placed
should be identified for cost reduction analysis.
[Ref. 10: end. 3]
The variable cost to hold items of inventory
reflects the monetary penalty of holding inventories in
anticipation for future use. The variable cost to hold
inventory consists of a charge for the investment of
capital, losses due to obsolescence, other losses of
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on-hand assets and storage costs. These elements are





Investment cost . The view taken towards the
investment of funds in inventory is that each
public dollar so invested represents a dollar of
investment in the private sector for egone . . . . An
annual charge of ten percent of the average on-
hand inventory will be made. . .
.
2. Cost of losses due to obsolescence include
losses of material due to all causes that render
the on-hand material superfluous to need. Thus
this element will include losses due to
technological obsolescence, over-forecasting of
requirements, deterioration beyond the point of
use, and other causes. . .
.
3. Other losses . This element is intended to cover
losses due to such causes as pilferage,
shrinkage, inventory adjustments, etc....
4. Storage cost . This represents both the "out-of-
pocket" costs incurred in the keeping of
inventory and the amortized cost of the storage
facilities. The cost of storing the inventory
itself includes: care of material in storage,
rewarehousing costs, cost of physical inventory
operations, preservation and packaging, training
of storage personnel, cost of warehousing
equipment and pro-rated base services and
overhead costs. The sum of these annual costs
divided by total average on-hand
inventory .. .gives the "out-of-pocket" storage
cost rate.... [Ref. 10: end. 4]
The obsolescence loss rate is computed by dividing the
value of transfers to disposal by the value of on-hand
plus on-order assets. The rate of other losses is
based on a three-to-five year moving average wherein
the adjustment, if positive, is set equal to zero.
Storage costs are estimated to be one percent of the
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total inventory value. The Navy's inventory control
points estimate the total annual holding cost to be 23
percent of the dollar value of each item held in
inventory, and therefore total annual holding cost for
those activities is equal to 23 percent of total
inventory value.
Shortage costs, when used for budget computations,
are a function of the performance goals established to
meet operational readiness and operating tempo
objectives. When used in daily operations, shortage
cost is a function of funding levels or other
management decisions relative to short-term management
objectives. In those instances when a desired level of
performance is specified in terms of the number of days
permissible for the delay of work prior to material
availability, the shortage cost becomes fixed and
directly impacts the funds required for investment in
inventory such that larger inventory investments will
be required. Conversely, if the funding level is
predetermined, the shortage cost becomes fixed and the
level of performance is directly affected. [Ref. 10:
end. 2]
These cost elements are useful when determining
economic order quantities (EOQ) and making other
management decisions regarding individual items.
However, computations become cumbersome when these
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elements are applied to management decisions regarding
overall inventory investment.
E . SUMMARY
The large federal budget deficits of the 1980s have
created the need to control government spending,
particularly when that spending is excessive or
wasteful. As a result, naval shipyards have been
forced to exercise greater control over the cost of
ship repairs and overhauls. Part of the effort to
control costs is reflected in recent changes in ship
maintenance philosophies. These changes primarily
exist in more frequent, brief maintenance periods and
fewer extensive, long-term overhauls.
The key to cost reduction is through cost and
schedule control while completing the repair work in
the required maintenance time period. Such control
exists in well-defined work packages, well-written job
orders and key event schedules which are routinely
followed. Job orders serve to identify the material
required to perform overhaul and repair work, while
specific key events determine the timing of the
material requirement. The failure of any of these
elements will potentially result in the inability to
complete work when required, which in turn may result
in undesirable cost increases.
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Most shipyard material is recorded in one of three
inventory accounts: Direct Material Inventory (DMI),
Shop Stores Inventory and Unassigned Direct Material
(UDM) Inventory. DMI material is obtained for use in
the repair of specific vessels, and Shop Stores
material is stocked by the shipyard based on recurring
demand and common use. The Unassigned Direct Material
account consists of "excess" material, formerly
assigned to one of the other inventory accounts, for
which a potential future need exists. If not used
within the first 24 months from the time that the
material is transferred to the UDM account, the
material is returned to supply system stock or
transferred to disposal. Monetary credit is received
for the value of inventory returned to the supply
system.
Shipyards utilize an on-line data processing system
known as Material Management (MM) to record and control
the procurement, receipt, movement, inspection, storage
and issue of material. Fully integrated into the
shipyard management information system, the MM
application is at the center of shipyard material
management efforts.
These concepts are the basis for understanding the
inventory management problems discussed in the
remainder of this study. In addition, these concepts
32





Inventory management problems at naval shipyards
were cited by the U.S. General Accounting Office ( GAO
)
as early as 1978 [Ref. 11]. At that time, the GAO
reported that more efficient material management
practices were needed in order to overcome existing
weaknesses in shipyard material requirements
determination. Specifically, the report recommended
that procedures be implemented which would utilize
historical material usage data for determining future
(planned) material requirements, as well as procedures
for identifying and recording excess material. They
also recommended that physical inventories be taken at
specific shipyards where inventory records were found
to be inaccurate. The shipyards responded by
developing applications within the shipyard management
information system which would provide historical usage
data to planning department personnel.
Between 1979 and 1983, the value of inventories at
naval shipyards increased from $250.8 million to $523.4
million--an increase of 63 percent adjusted for
inflation [Ref. 12: p. 23]. This prompted the GAO to
conduct another review to evaluate the effectiveness of
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material management activities within the shipyards.
This review, published in May 1985, was conducted
between November 1983 and October 1984 and consisted of
work performed at four naval shipyards and at NAVSEA
headquarters. Two privately-owned shipyards were also
visited in order to determine how shipyard materials
are managed in the private sector. The GAO discovered
that the problems existing in 1978 continued to be
problems in 1984, although corrective action had been
taken based on the 1978 report.
The GAO discovered that historical data for direct
material was incomplete, inaccurate and not being
utilized for material planning. Data was being
maintained for material issued throughout overhauls,
but data regarding material actually used was not
accumulated. In addition, the data base failed to
include items manufactured within the shipyard for
installation on overhaul vessels. Without accurate
data regarding material actually used, the shipyards
continued to order material for future overhauls that
was not actually required. [Ref. 12: p. 4] This
problem was further complicated by the fact that unused
material was not routinely returned to the storeroom.
This material usually remained in production shops
unrecorded on inventory records. Long Beach supply
personnel estimated in June 1984 that the value of
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excess materials at that shipyard was well over $14
million [Ref. 12: p. 9].
The failure to analyze historical usage data
prevents the identification of the materials actually
needed to perform overhaul work. As a result, some
amount of unneeded material is ordered and placed in
inventory and some required material is not ordered
until the work is in progress. This creates excess
material as well as increases the amount of material
that must be ordered after start of overhaul. For
example
,
...Norfolk's electronics shop analyzed materials that
had been ordered for four ships after overhauls had
started and found that the production department had
ordered about 64 percent of the 3,345 line items
ultimately used. [Ref. 12: p. 5]
Such shortages reduce the overall efficiency of
shipyard operations by requiring that production
personnel delay or reschedule work while awaiting
material. The GAO reported that
...one mechanic estimated that 350 of the 1400 labor-
hours he spent overhauling high pressure air
(compressors) could have been eliminated if the
planning department had ordered all materials needed
for the overhauls. [Ref. 12: p. 7]
This additional time was devoted to identifying
required materials and preparing Job Material Lists.
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The need to order material once work begins on
particular jobs also increases costs due to the
additional time required to manually process and
expedite those additional requisitions. When material
needs are properly identified prior to start of work,
expediting actions are kept at a minimum and devoted
only to those situations in which early identification
of material was not possible. As revealed in Table 2,
the amount of time devoted to expediting by supply
personnel at Norfolk Naval Shipyard is exceptionally
high, particularly in the receipt control and
purchasing divisions. Time devoted to expediting
normally results in time away from regular duties.
TABLE 2
MATERIAL EXPEDITING AT NORFOLK NAVAL SHIPYARD
Persons involved Time spent








Source: United States General Accounting Office Report,











Late identification of material often requires that
requisitions be submitted at a priority higher than
might otherwise be required had the material need been
identified earlier. Priority abuses slow Navy supply
system response times because high-priority
requisitions frequently require manual processing at
inventory stock points. OPNAV Instruction 4614. IF
requires that no more than 50 percent of shipyard
requisitions be categorized as high priority. In a
separate study, the GAO found that six naval shipyards
exceeded that guideline in August 1983, and all eight
shipyards exceeded the guideline in July 1985 (see
Table 3) [Ref . 13: p. 21 ]
.
Costs are also incurred in storing and managing
excess (unused) material, the extent of which depends
on the amount of unused material generated. The GAO
report indicates that private shipyard officials
believe that unused materials should not exceed five to
ten percent of the materials ordered, whereas NAVSEA
proposed a goal of 15 percent [Ref. 12: p. 8]. Unused
material for overhauls at naval shipyards between
January 1982 and March 1984 was 16.85 percent of the
material ordered, and valued at $166 million. The
amount of excess material ordered by individual
shipyards varied between 6.78 percent and 44.43
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TABLE 3
HIGH PRIORITY REQUISITIONS BY SHIPYARDS
Percentage assigned a high priority
Shipyard Guideline August 1983 July 1 983
Norfolk 50 72.4 79.6
Portsmouth 50 51.1 75.0
Long Beach 50 81.2 65.4
Mare Island 50 79.3 63.8
Pearl Harbor 50 (a) 57.9
Philadelphia 50 71.7 56.6
Charleston 50 66.5 55.5
Puget Sound 50 (a) 54.5
^Did not exceed guideline
Source: United States General Accounting Office Report,
Intermediate Inventories Can Be Reduced
,
October 1986.
percent. Table 4 contains the data obtained by the GAO
for each of the shipyards.
Inventory accuracy, at least in the Shop Stores
Inventory account, was also found to be a significant
problem. A 1984 Naval Audit Service sample of 319 Shop
Stores items at Norfolk Naval Shipyard indicated that
on-hand balances were incorrect for 69 percent of the
sample. Inventories of Shop Stores material, although
required annually (at that time), were generally not
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TABLE 4
VALUE OF NAVAL SHIPYARD EXCESS MATERIAL
Value of Material Percent of
Shipyard Received Unused^ material ordered
(millions
)
Portsmouth $ 67.3 $ 29.9 44.43
Long Beach 99.4 14.4^ 14.49
Charleston 93.8 21.1 22.49
Pearl Harbor 82.8 14.7 17.75
Puget Sound 218.5 31.9 14.60






Mare Island 116.5 6.78
Philadelphia 177.7 . 7.48
Total $ 989.9 . 16.85
^In some instances the amount of unused material
was understated because it was taken from shipyard
reports prepared during overhauls. These reports
did not include unused materials which were turned
in after the reports were issued. NAVSEA officials
noted that amounts reported also included some
duplicate items because materials not used on one
overhaul could be transferred to a future overhaul
and still not be used.
^Includes $7 million in unused materials for the
USS New Jersey. Long Beach had reported $307,000
in its financial statement, but the Navy Auditor
General stated excess materials were worth $7
million
.
Source: United States General Accounting Office Report,





"being performed at all. Of Mare Island Naval
Shipyard's 26 shop stores, three had not been
inventoried since 1979, eight since 1980 and one since
1981. The results of the most recent inventories at
Mare Island also indicated an error rate of 82 percent
in one shop store and 91 percent in another shop store.
The GAO inventoried 53 items valued at $72,000 at Mare
Island and discovered that inventory records for 38 of
the items, or 71.7 percent, were incorrect. [Ref. 12:
p. 14] Data indicating the degree of disparity in
individual inventory records was not available. For
example, when records indicate an on-hand balance of
100 units when 101 units exist in inventory, an error
exists but is less severe than if only 25 units exist
in inventory.
Accurate inventory records are the foundation from
which all inventory management action is taken. When
inaccurate records exist, material reorders take place
either earlier or later than they should and material
shortages occur when the records show material on-hand
but none actually exists. Material shortages often
result in production delays, requiring costly manual
requisition processing and expediting. Incorrect on-
hand record quantities also impede the application of
economic order quantities, which in turn results in
less than optimal ordering and holding costs. Material
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quantities in excess of immediate and projected
requirements also increase material holding costs,
preclude the use of material elsewhere within the
Department of Defense, and cause additional inventory
investments to be made within DOD for material that
would otherwise be available were it identified as
excess and returned to Navy supply system stock.
Excess holding costs are also attributed to existing
material that is not recorded in the inventory
accounts
.
Inaccurate inventory records are not unique to
naval shipyards. This problem was known to exist
throughout a number of Navy activities, and in the
summer of 1984 (while the GAO shipyard review was being
conducted) then-Secretary of the Navy John Lehman
imposed a Navy-wide freeze on the disposal or transfer
of excess material [Ref. 14]. The purpose of this
freeze was to ensure that Navy activities were
transferring valid excess material, which required that
inventory records be verified prior to material
transfer. This freeze was incrementally lifted, by
Navy activity, throughout the following 12 months as
actual excess material quantities were verified at the
various Navy activities holding material stocks.
However, this freeze was not lifted for naval shipyards
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until February 1988, a situation which has enhanced the
existing amount of excess material.
GAO believed that one of the major reasons material
management problems existed at naval shipyards was
because shipyards were not held accountable for
implementing systems and procedures to improve material
management. Shipyard personnel also were not held
accountable for implementing required procedures and
improving management efficiency. Part of the problem
was the lack of well-defined standards such as goals
for the percentage of direct materials ordered after
the start of overhaul and the percentage of unused
direct materials remaining at the completion of
overhaul. The GAO recommended that such goals be
established and that individual performance be measured
against the accomplishment of those goals. [Ref. 12:
pp. 18-19]
Problems very similar to those discussed above were
found to exist throughout the Department of Defense and
were addressed in testimony before Congress by the
Comptroller General of the United States in October
1987. The Comptroller General cited the following
problems that were found after comprehensive audits
(347 reports) at 30 DOD locations over the previous
five years:
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...DOD does not have accurate data on which to base
management decisions. Therefore, DOD needs to place
increased emphasis on inventory management,
particularly because of inventory growth over the
past few years, which has added to previous problems.
The value of DOD ' s inventory of secondary items, such
as repair parts and supplies, is estimated at over
$90 billion , almost twice as large as it was just 5
years ago. This inventory may be more than DOD needs
or can efficiently manage. For example:
1
.
There has been a significant increase in the
amount of secondary item inventories excess to
requirements. At the beginning of fiscal year
1987, these excesses were valued at $29.5
billion, up from $10.2 billion in 1981.
2. DOD has bought large amounts of repair parts, in
support of newly fielded systems, that are not
needed to support the systems in the first few
years of their operations.
3. DOD warehouses are being filled to capacity
resulting in DOD relaxing its policy of not
disposing of any item supporting a weapon system
still being used. [Ref. 15: pp. 1-2]
DOD inventory error rates were consistent with the
error rates previously presented for naval shipyards.
Although shipyards are included in the preceding data,
it is obvious that shipyards are only a small part of a
very large and complex problem. Such a system, at
least within an organization as large and complex as
the Department of Defense, will never be perfect and
some inventory problems will always exist that require
management attention. The magnitude of the problem,




To ensure an impartial and comprehensive analysis,
as well as to derive the benefits of practices within
the private sector, the U.S. Navy contracted with the
public accounting firm Coopers & Lybrand for the
performance of a management analysis of Navy Industrial
Fund activities. This review, completed in June 1986,
was directed at the eight naval shipyards. Over 1400
interviews, extensive independent observations and
document analysis were conducted which resulted in
approximately 500 issues with recommendations for
change [Ref. 16: p. i] . Although the review was
directed at all shipyard operations, a significant
segment was related to the material and inventory
management areas. As stated in the report:
Problems in shipyard material management cut across
functional boundaries within the shipyard and
directly affect the shipyard's mission of overhauling
and repairing ships on time, within cost and to
requisite quality standards. [Ref. 16: p. MM-1]
The findings of this management analysis support the
findings of the GAO which were previously discussed.
For brevity, only new data from the Coopers & Lybrand
report is presented in the remaining paragraphs of this
section.
Coopers & Lybrand found a unique concern for
material related issues within the naval shipyard
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environment. Management, it seemed, was extremely
apprehensive that delays or disruptions in repair work
would result from the failure to have the proper
materials on-hand prior to the start of work. The
auditors believed that this "conservative" attitude is
responsible for creating costly inventory management
methods. These methods in turn create many of the
problems that they are intended to prevent. The report
determined that
:
This conservatism results in duplication of effort,
excess identified and unidentified material
inventories and increased numbers of indirect
personnel assigned to material management functions.
At the same time, effective control of material
management processes is impeded by overlapping of
organizational responsibilities, problems with the
timeliness and accuracy of information system data,
conflicting directives, inadequate or incomplete
procurement technical data, separation of procurement
from the user activity, outdated and ineffective
inventory management and material distribution
systems and the delivery of defective or out-of-
specification material. [Ref. 16: p. MM-1]
The existence of these conditions result in excessive
material costs not only in terms of inventory dollar
value but also in procurement and carrying costs (which
includes both labor and facilities) as well as
increased costs due to schedule delays. Ultimately,
such cost increases are passed on to the customer as
part of shipyard overhead costs (see Figure 1 on page
7).
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The auditors also discovered that about 25 percent
of the material requisitioned during the pre-overhaul
period was not on-hand prior to the beginning of the
repair period. Thirty-five percent of the material
actually required for an overhaul is ordered after the
repair period begins, and 20 percent of that material
is required to support work that is not identified
during the pre-overhaul planning period [Ref. 16: p.
MM-4] . Contributing to this problem is the existing
materials planning, requisitioning and distribution
process which involves various independent
responsibility centers. The absence of coordinated
effort causes a duplication of functions which in turn
contributes to multiple material orders and prevents
the assignment of responsibility when errors are
identified. Material orders are written without
consideration for timing of Jobs during an overhaul,
the sequence of those jobs or the ability to obtain
material by the required start of work. Long-leadtime
material (LLTM) orders are batched with standard stock
orders and little or no followup is performed during
the procurement process. As a result, material is
often not available when called for and production
delays occur. On the other hand, the early receipt of
standard stock material unnecessarily increases the
cost of material storing and handling when the material
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remains idle for months or years awaiting the start of
work. Improved scheduling, coordination and management
would serve to decrease the costs and schedule delays
created by this situation.
Several problems were identified in the materials
planning and procurement process. Formal make-or-buy
procedures, although in existence, are not consistently
followed [Ref. 16: p. MM-12]. Procurement personnel
are not a part of the make-or-buy decision process and
are therefore not consulted regarding cost or
procurement alternatives. Technical documents provided
for requirements determination are incomplete or
inaccurate for approximately 25 percent of the non-
standard materials required, creating problems in
writing procurement specifications [Ref. 16: p. MM-13].
As a result, data provided on Job Material Lists is
frequently inadequate, requiring that 40 percent of the
JMLs submitted be returned for additional information
[Ref. 16: p. iyiM-15]. A significant deficiency
recognized was the absence of any central procurement
organization which coordinated major purchases for
several or all shipyards. Such an organization could
eliminate duplication of procurement actions as well as




Existing purchase regulations prevent the use of
specifications which would single out a unique purchase
source unless such action can be proven absolutely
necessary. Without tailored specifications, material
is often purchased that cannot by used without
substantial rework [Ref. 16: p. MM-19]. During 1986,
13 percent of the material placed into use was rejected
as non-functional. Work delays are often experienced
because the true material condition is indeterminate
until just prior to installation. Three shipyards must
rely on other activities for procurement of non-
standard material and as a result exercise little
management control over this function.
C . SUMMARY
The inventory management problems at naval
shipyards are numerous and complex. The financial
impact of these problems is significant and positive
corrective action is overdue. Specific guidance is
required which will provide shipyards with specific
management goals which will both improve performance
and serve as a measure of performance. Material
planning, which is currently 40 percent ineffective as
measured against the existing policy to have all
material on-hand prior to start of work, must be
improved with better technical data for material
identification and the analysis of historical usage
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data for requirements determination. In addition, as
discussed by Coopers & Lybrand, the policy requiring
that all material be on-hand prior to start of work
contributes to excessively high inventory levels which
are accompanied by increased procurement and carrying
costs. Material inventories and inventory records must
by verified and corrected in order that sound inventory
decisions may be made. Finally, procurement policies
should be streamlined and activities coordinated in
order to benefit from economies of scale.
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IV. METHODOLOGY
The tremendous attention given to the inventory
management issue within the Department of Defense in
recent years has resulted in the publication of
numerous reports on the subject. These reports are
very consistent in the treatment of inventory
management problems within naval shipyards, and were
relied upon as a major source of research data. These
reports, as well as other items of literature
describing shipyard operations, were obtained from
Naval Postgraduate School faculty, the Knox Library of
the Naval Postgraduate School, the United States
General Accounting Office and Charleston Naval
Shipyard.
The literature was reviewed in detail in order to
gain an understanding of naval shipyard operations and
material management procedures. The documents relating
to prior studies were then studied in detail and
evaluated based on the relative findings in each
report. These documents provided a detailed evaluation
of the magnitude and extent of inventory management
problems at naval shipyards. Key issues and concerns
were identified in order to develop a framework for
this study.
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Additional relevant resource data was also obtained
from Naval Sea Systems Command headquarters and
Charleston Naval Shipyard. This data, reflecting
historical inventory levels and operating costs at all
eight shipyards for the five year period ended 50
September 1987, served as original source data which
supports, in part, the findings of the prior studies.
The primary purpose of this data was to determine the
kinds of inventory management data utilized by
responsible personnel to monitor performance as well as
to provide a realistic basis for problem resolution.
Personal (telephone) interviews were conducted with
personnel responsible for inventory management
decisions in order to clarify questions that arose
during data analysis. Problems not otherwise
identified in earlier studies were discussed to
determine the validity of those issues. Alternatives
for problem resolution were also discussed in order to
evaluate the feasibility of proposed corrective action.
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V. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
A. OVERVIEW
Between fiscal years 1983 and 1987, the total value
of inventory at the eight naval shipyards increased
18.37 percent, from $518.7 million to $614 million.
Direct Material Inventory (DMI) increased 6.5 percent
(from $267.5 million to $285 million), Shop Stores
Inventory increased 12.05 percent (from $200.8 million
to $225 million) and Unassigned Direct Material ( UDM
)
Inventory increased 106.35 percent (from $50.4 million
to $104 million). Total inventory actually decreased
4.9 percent between 1983 and 1984, but has steadily
increased over the past three years. Figure 4
demonstrates the changes that have occurred in the
three inventory accounts, as well as total inventory,
during the five years ending in 1987.
Total inventory has increased as shipyards have
made a transition to repair and overhaul work that is
more expensive with respect to the material required.
For example, naval shipyards are now performing the
majority of the Navy's submarine overhauls. The
advanced weapons, navigational and communications
systems in existence on submarines and other vessels




























Source: Naval Sea System Command, August 1987.
Figure 4. Naval Shipyard Inventory Value, FY83-FY87
Submarines, in particular, require material which is
tested and inspected extensively prior to acceptance
and installation. As a result, procurement and
handling costs are greater for those items. In
addition, the moratorium on the transfer or disposal of
material since mid-1984 has contributed to larger
inventory levels which is reflected in the large growth
in the Unassigned Direct Material account. The holding
of excess material for more than 24- months after the
completion of shipyard availabilities also increases
total inventory value and has been a major contributor
to the increase in days inventory on-hand from 24-5 days
in 1983 to 433 days in 1987.
As a percentage of total shipyard operating costs,
total inventory has increased from 14 percent to 17.7
54
percent between 1983 and 1987. Operating costs during
this period decreased from $3,705 billion to $3,469
billion reflecting improved management efforts to
control costs. Total inventory as a percent of
operating costs during the five year period is




























Source: Naval Sea Systems Command, August 1987.
Figure 5. Total Inventory Value as a Percent of
Operating Costs
Direct costs, as described in Chapter I, consist of
direct material and direct labor components. In 1983,
direct material charged to customers was 32 percent of
direct cost, whereas by 1987, this ratio had decreased
to 25 percent of direct cost. This downward trend is
the result of two major factors: (1) the implementation
of procedures for material requirements determination
which utilize historical usage data, when available,
and (2) the sourcing of increasing numbers of material
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requirements to assets in the Unassigned Direct
Material account and to potential excess assets in the
Direct Material Inventory account. Both of these
actions reduce the investment in inventory and
ultimately reduce the costs passed on to the customer.
During this period, direct material charged per direct
manhour decreased from $7.00 to $6.00, while direct
labor costs have decreased due to increased management
effort to reduce costs in order to remain competitive
with private shipyards.
Material rejection rates have decreased from 12.2
percent of total material ordered in 1983 to 11.1
percent in 1987. This decrease is an indication of
increased utilization of reliable vendors in the
purchase of material, including more stringent
evaluation, prior to contract award, of an individual
vendor's ability to satisfy material requirements. For
example, 80 percent of the paint purchased by
Charleston Naval Shipyard (CNSYD) during a recent
period was rejected due to the failure to conform to
military standards for shipboard use. Appropriate
action was taken to ensure that vendors selected for
future procurements could provide materials that meet
military standards, and vendors unable to meet these
standards were excluded from award consideration. In
addition, technical data used to identify material for
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procurement has improved such that procurement sources
are better able to respond to procurement requests.
Shipyards have taken positive steps to improve
inventory accuracy as demonstrated by the following
data obtained from Charleston Naval Shipyard.
During fiscal year 1987, the Internal Review Office
at Charleston Naval Shipyard verified the accuracy of
the DMI and UDM accounts utilizing statistical sampling
techniques. The DMI account was found to have an
accuracy rate of 99.3 percent and the UDM account had
an accuracy rate of 99.4 percent. The error rate of
this sample was plus or minus 3 percent at a confidence
level of 95 percent. The Internal Review Office did
not verify the accuracy of the Shop Stores Inventory;
however, Charleston uses a combination of inventory
physical count systems to ensure the accuracy of this
inventory account. The Supply Department performs a
statistical random sample inventory of each storeroom
during the first month of each quarter and utilizes the
Penalty Cost Model daily during the second and third
months of each quarter. Wall-to-wall storeroom
inventories are performed only if the results of random
sample inventories indicate that such action is
warranted.
The Penalty Cost Model was developed by the Naval
Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) and has been
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implemented at the naval shipyards for management of
the Shop Stores Inventory account. This model utilizes
data produced through routine transactions to determine
economic order quantities and reorder points for the
individual material items. Those items with high issue
frequencies or high unit costs are then automatically
selected for physical inventory at predetermined times
(i.e., 50 or 60 days) prior to the computed reorder
point. This ensures that physical inventory counts and
inventory records are accurate prior to reorder. Such
action prevents unnecessary investments in inventory
when overages exist, and ensures that sufficient
material is ordered to prevent production delays due to
shortages. In addition, spot checks of Shop Stores
items are routinely performed based on computer
generated notices when a transaction mismatch occurs,
or based on requests from individuals responsible for
inventory management. The Penalty Cost Model, although
it places less emphasis on day-to-day inventory
accuracy than other inventory methods, has been used
primarily in order to minimize the costs associated
with periodic physical inventories. However, its use
results in exceptionally low overall inventory accuracy
rates because only those items requiring reorder are
inventoried on a routine basis.
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The overall accuracy of Charleston's Shop Stores
account was 69 percent at the end of 1987, a
significant improvement compared to the 50 percent
accuracy rate experienced during 1986. This
improvement results from increased management attention
and the initiation of corrective action regarding
previously identified Shop Stores Inventory problems.
For example, to improve the flow of issue documents, a
locked box system was installed throughout various
warehouse issue points for the deposit of issue
documents by warehouse personnel. These documents are
periodically collected by designated personnel and
delivered to individuals responsible for updating
inventory records. This system has resulted in a
decrease in the number of lost issue documents, and has
contributed to increased inventory accuracy.
In February 1988, the Commander, Naval Sea Systems
Command issued revised inventory management policies
for implementation at naval shipyards [Ref. 17]. These
changes were issued in response to the problems
identified by the GAO and Coopers & Lybrand studies,
and will eventually be incorporated in NAVSEAINST
7600.27, "The Navy Industrial Fund Financial Management
Systems and Procedures Manual".
This directive requires that shipyards establish
material handling procedures and methods which will
59
reduce existing inventory inaccuracies. Internal
controls for the documentation of material from time of
receipt to storage, and from storage to issue are to be
included. All transactions must be recorded in the MM
system, as much as possible, by the shipyard
department/division accountable for the material.
Ninety-five percent of the material not subject to
formal quality assurance inspections must be processed
to storage location, or to the customer (for direct-
turnover material), within three working days from time
of receipt. Individual shipyards are responsible to
determine the adequacy of programs developed.
Shipyards are also required to establish programs
to improve, as well as maintain, inventory accuracy.
Included are specific performance goals for the three
inventory accounts. Inventory accuracy for the Shop
Stores account must equal or exceed 75 percent in
fiscal year 1988, 85 percent in fiscal year 1989 and 90
percent in fiscal year 1990. Both the DMI and UDM
accounts must have inventory accuracies of at least 90
percent in fiscal year 1988, 95 percent in fiscal year
1989 and 98 percent in fiscal year 1990. All inventory
accounts must have location accuracies of at least 97
percent. Specific performance toward the accomplishment
of these goals must be reported semi-annually, in
writing, the the Shipyard Commander, Comptroller,
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Supply Officer, Production Officer and Planning
Officer. Physical inventories are required as
indicated in Chapter 11.
Specific policy changes for the management of
Direct Material Inventory, Shop Stores Inventory and
Unassigned Direct Material Inventory are addressed in
the following sections.
B. DIRECT MATERIAL INVENTORY
As discussed in Chapter II, the Direct Material
Inventory account consists of all material obtained to
support specific customer overhaul or repair work.
This material is frequently placed on order 12 to 18
months prior to the start of overhaul, and is often
received and placed in inventory as early as two years
prior to the time that the material is actually
required. This system was designed to eliminate
overhaul and repair delays caused by lack of material.
The GAO discovered, however, that this system usually
resulted in the ordering of large amounts of excess
material, primarily because historical usage data was
not routinely considered when determining material
requirements [Ref. 12: p. 9]. Schedule delays are
actually avoided by the shifting of smaller jobs within
the overall work structure, combined with the
expediting of material and the use of overtime labor.
61
The costs of these alternatives are potentially high
depending on the extent to which they are used.
Revised NAVSEA policy requires that material "...be
ordered to be on-hand in sufficient time to support the
industrial process...." [Ref. 17: p. 11] While this
policy eliminates the requirement to have all required
material on-hand prior to the start of shipyard
availabilities, it does not prevent material from being
ordered and received well in advance of the date
actually required. To minimize the investment in
inventory, and in the absence of further guidance from
NAVSEA, individual shipyards should develop procedures
which will ensure that material is not received far in
advance of the date that the material is actually
required. Because material delivery times cannot be
controlled absolutely, and because individual jobs must
often be shifted to prevent overall schedule delays
(due to the non-availability of material), orders
should arrive no earlier than 30 days prior to the time
actually required.
Current policies also require that excess material
remain in the DMI account, assigned to specific ships,
until the end of maintenance periods. However, at the
completion of individual job orders, material is
identified as "DMI Category Four" indicating that the
material is no longer required for production support.
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Such action makes material available for other current
or future DMI requirements and permits the cancellation
of outstanding orders for identical material. This
material is also available to other activities as
needed. The DMI account remains inflated, however,
because material that is no longer required remains in
the account. This material should be returned to
system stock or transferred to the UDM account in order
to increase its visibility as excess.
To further reduce the investment in Direct Material
Inventory, historical usage data must be considered
prior to the preparation of material requests. This
action is now being performed at individual shipyards
for those items for which historical usage data is
available. DMI has continued to increase primarily
because material is purchased well in advance of
scheduled start of overhaul dates and is retained in
the DMI account until overhaul completion. This trend
could be reversed by ordering material based on
individual job order start dates when historical
procurement leadtimes are known, and by fully releasing
material at the completion of individual job orders.
In those instances where historical procurement
leadtimes are not available. Navy stock point average
turnaround times (for specific classes of material)
could be obtained and utilized as estimated shipyard
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procurement lead-times. Material should be ordered for
direct delivery to requiring shops whenever possible to
reduce both handling and storage costs.
In order to evaluate material planning, ordering
and usage, NAVSEA now requires that the amount of
unused DMI material be evaluated at the end of each
shipyard availability. A goal to remain at less than
ten percent unused DMI material has been established,
and is calculated to include all material on-hand or
due-in to support the availability. Results must be
reported to the Shipyard Commander, Supply Officer,
Production Officer and Planning Officer. Corrective
action is required in order that improvement be
experienced during future availabilities. While this
is an excellent start for monitoring inventory
management performance, additional performance goals
should be established for the percentage of high-
priority requisitions submitted due to improper
requirements determination. Managers should, be
evaluated, in part, based on the ability to achieve
these goals. Penalties should be imposed when these
goals are not consistently met.
C. SHOP STORES INVENTORY
The Shop Stores Inventory consists of commonly used
material that is stocked based on previous demand,
safety stock requirements and expected production
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and/or planning department requirements. This account
consists mostly of standard-stock government material.
Non-standard material is stocked only when standard-
stock material does not exist or fails to meet shipyard
industrial requirements. Fast-moving, low-value items
are pre-expended subject to locally established dollar
value ceilings.
Safety stock (including insurance items) is limited
to the minimum quantity required to prevent work
stoppages and to support emergency situations. Reorder
points and order quantities for insurance items are
determined based on experienced judgment and are set to
achieve economic order quantity replenishment, one-
for-one replenishment or zero-balance replenishment
[Ref . 17: p. 2]
.
Individual items are established as demand-based
when at least two demands have been experienced in a 12
month period, and are maintained as demand-based if at
least one demand has been experienced in the previous
36 months. Reorder points and order quantities are
computed automatically every month based on economic
order quantity models. [Ref. 17: p. 1] High dollar
value and high quantity limits are established locally
to ensure the review of selected orders prior to final
document submission.
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Although the Shop Stores Inventory account has
increased 12.05 percent over the past five years, the
majority of this growth occurred during 1983 and 1984
as shipyards experienced a change in the type of work
performed. This growth has stabilized primarily as the
result of increased upper -management effort toward
reducing the size of this inventory account.
Requirements have been re-evaluated in recent years and
material excess to requirements has been transferred or
disposed of. The value of this account will remain
excessively high, however, as a result of the
requirement to retain material in the Shop Stores
account, as demand-based, when only one demand in 36
months is experienced. A criterion such as one demand
within the previous 12 months would reduce the items
retained as demand-based and would significantly reduce
the value of the Shop Stores Inventory account.
Shop Stores material is classified as excess based
on several criteria, depending on the sub-category of
the material. Demand-based items are considered excess
when the on-hand quantity exceeds the shipyard
requisitioning objective plus 24 months demand. Items
are considered inactive when no demand has been
experienced within the previous 36 months. Insurance
items are reviewed every two years to evaluate the
future need for the material, and processed as excess
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material if it is determined that the material is no
longer required. Excesses are disposed of, transferred
to the UDM account or retained in the Shop Stores
account at the discretion of shipyard management.
Shop Stores excess and inactive items must be made
available to other activities, but not necessarily
transferred to the UDM account. [Ref. 17: p. 7] All
Shop Stores excess should be transferred to the UDM
account, however, in order to reduce the value of the
Shop Stores Inventory account as well as increase the
visibility of this excess material.
The revised NAVSEA policies have established both
stock turn and service level goals for material in the
Shop Stores account. Non-NIF material, material not-
ready-for-issue and insurance items are not included in
the stock turn calculations. Goals for stock turn have
been established as 1.0 times for fiscal year 1988 and
1 .5 times for fiscal year 1989. Stock turn
calculations are reported to the Supply Officer
quarterly. [Ref. 17: p. 8] Such goals will ensure that
managers devote effort toward the identification and
transfer of excess Shop Stores material.
Service level is defined as the percentage of
stocked requirements that are satisfied upon initial
request, and are determined by computing the percentage
of zero-balance items versus the total number of items
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in the Shop Stores account. Items ordered for the
first time that have zero balances are included in the
calculation. Existing goals are to equal or exceed 97
percent when new items are excluded from the
computation, and to equal or exceed 95 percent when new
items are included. The revised policies also require
that high-demand, zero-balance items be reviewed for
possible expediting action. Shop Stores service levels
are computed monthly. [Ref. 17: p. 9]
Because most items carried in the Shop Stores
Inventory account are stock numbered, and because seven
of the eight naval shipyards are located near Naval
Supply Centers, shipyards should place increased
reliance on the supply system for backup stocks.
Safety stocks could therefore be decreased, reducing
the overall investment in the Shop Stores account.
Established service goals could still be met through
the existence of cycle stocks maintained on the basis
of demand and properly computed reorder quantities.
Such a philosophy should not be used at Portsmouth
Naval Shipyard, however, due to its distance from a
supply center.
D. UNASSIGNED DIRECT MATERIAL INVENTORY
The Unassigned Direct Material Inventory account
consists of unused material previously assigned to the
DMI account, Shop Stores material evaluated as excess
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to requirements and unused material returned from
production shops. Material is transferred to the UDM
account from DMI at the completion of shipyard
availabilities and is retained for a maximum of 24
months based on expected future requirements for that
material. At the end of this period, material is
returned to system stock or otherwise disposed of
unless expected future requirements exist for the
material. Material may also be retained for extended
periods based on direction from NAVSEA or when
management considers it unwise to transfer the material
(i.e., the item is high-cost or unique to shipyard
industrial use). Material for particular ship-types is
transferred to other shipyards when the holding
shipyard no longer has use for the material and the
receiving shipyard has responsibility for work which
requires that material. Material is transferred to the
DMI or Shop Stores accounts when a need is identified
in either of those inventory accounts.
In 1983, the Unassigned Direct Material (UDM)
account was valued at $50.4 million and was 9.72
percent of total shipyard inventories. By the end of
1987, this inventory account had increased to $104
million and was 16.94 percent of total shipyard
inventories. The dramatic growth is this inventory
account is an obvious indication that a policy did not
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exist to ensure the timely transfer or disposal of
material from this account.
NAVSEA ' s revised inventory management policies
require that individual shipyards establish goals for
the percentage of UDM utilized. This quarterly ratio
is determined by dividing the value of transfers
(excluding disposal actions and returns to the supply
system) by the average monthly value of the UDM account
for the quarter. Monthly reports are also required
that indicate the current UDM balance as well as trends
in growth or reduction. [Ref. 17: p. 20] Although this
action brings upper -management attention to the
management of the UDM account, specific goals are
required which are realistic yet provide the incentive
for the overall reduction of this account.
To increase the visibility of UDM assets, as well
as to minimize overall shipyard material costs, a
centralized data bank is being created at Navy Ships
Parts Control Center (SPCC) which will permit all
shipyards to source other shipyard UDM accounts prior
to the initiation of requisition or purchase requests.
This system will also provide visibility for shipyard
material assets throughout the Navy supply system.
A prototype system is currently being tested
between Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard and SPCC in order
to evaluate the system and correct system deficiencies.
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This system, to be known as the Shipyard Material
Visibility System, will be implemented at the remaining
shipyards at the completion of system testing, and will
be updated monthly based on current on-hand UDM
balances at each shipyard. Material identification
data will exist both for standard and non-standard
material items. Initially, data inquiries will be
performed manually for long-leadtime procurement
requests, but will be converted to automated screening
of all not-carried requests (above an established
dollar value) once system reliability is verified.
Before transfers of material take place,
individual shipyards must weigh the cost to transfer
material between shipyards against the costs to obtain
material through purchase actions. Material should be
transferred to requiring shipyards in all instances
where the transfer cost is less than the purchase cost
of new material. Purchase cost includes the dollar
cost of the material as well as the costs associated
with preparing and processing material orders. When
the transfer price of the material is the same as the
new material purchase price, the decision to transfer
the material is based on a comparision of transfer
costs and ordering costs. As a result, individual
shipyards may decide to purchase material when assets
exist at other shipyards. To reduce the overall
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investment in inventory, NAVSEA should establish
policies to ensure that existing assets (valued above a
specified dollar value) are utilized before additional
purchases are made. The costs of potential delays due
to the non-availability of material must also be
considered in the decision to either transfer or
purchase material.
When evaluating the decision to dispose of material
that is excess to expected future shipyard needs, the
cost to move that material should be compared to the
cost of maintaining that material. In all instances
where the cost to move is less than the cost to
maintain (except as noted below), the material should
be returned to system stock or disposed of, as
appropriate. When the cost to move is greater than the
cost to maintain, the material should be retained. The
operating costs of maintaining material in inventory
should include the following components:
1. Cost of taking physical inventories.
2. Cost of inventory records, including duplicate
locator systems.
3. Cost of duplicate bin locations.
4. Costs due to loss of space consolidation.
5. Costs due to loss of freight consolidation.
6. Cost of shelf-life surveys.
7. The differential in estimated second destination
transportation costs, if any.
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8. The differential between costs of commercial
storage sites or commercial versus government-
owned storage sites, if applicable.
9. Other additional costs, if any. [Ref. 18: p. 3]
Because of the long-term impact of these factors, it is
assumed that all obsolete material will be either
returned to system stock or disposed of. Special
consideration should be given to the inventory items





Items managed with a high degree of intensity
(i.e., high-cost, special manufacture or long
leadtime items).
2. Shelf-life or deteriorative items.
3. Bulky items or items requiring special handling
or transportation.
4. Items for which tactical, strategic, or national
emergency dictates overriding considerations.
5. High-demand items where the activity is the sole
or principal demand source. [Ref. 18: pp. 3-4]
This material should be retained or transferred based
on the experienced judgment of the responsible manager,
or on the basis of specific decision rules issued by
Naval Sea Systems Command. Specific decision rules
(such as individual dollar limits) do not currently




E. OPTIMAL INVENTORY LEVELS
Given the magnitude of naval shipyard inventories,
managers are concerned with the overall investment in
inventories and total inventory performance. However,
most theories addressing inventory management issues
are concerned with the behavior of individual items.
Although there are currently no funding constraints
regarding maximum inventory levels at naval shipyards,
federal budget limitations and increased attention
concerning Department of Defense and shipyard inventory
growth make such constraints inevitable in the future.
As a result, shipyards must be prepared to adopt
inventory models and practices which will optimize
customer service through the minimization of the cost
of material shortages, subject to investment as well as
workload constraints.
Such a model was recently developed by Everett S.
Gardner for use at Navy retail stock points [Ref. 19].
The purpose of this model is to provide managers with
trade-off curves which consider the aggregate
relationships among the number of inventory shortages
per unit time, a fixed lump-sum investment in inventory
and stock replenishment workload. The basic premise of
this model involves the reallocation of funds from
safety stocks to cycle stocks while keeping total
investment constant. Such a model could be adapted for
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shipyard use and is especially suited for use in
managing the Shop Stores Inventory account.
The first step in applying this model to naval
shipyards is to establish a budget constraint based on
the average number of months of stock required to
sustain shipyard operations. This constraint, although
fixed in total dollar amount, becomes flexible through
the variation of safety and cycle stocks. Next, a
customer service goal must be established relative to
the number of material requests that are filled
immediately at the time of initial customer demand.
The aim is to satisfy each request completely at the
time of initial receipt regardless of the number of
units demanded. A customer service goal from which 85-
90 percent of demands are filled at the time of initial
request would be reasonable given budget constraints
and the availability of back-up stocks within the Navy
supply system. The problem then becomes one of
identifying the exchange curve between customer service
and reordering workload at a given fixed investment.
[Ref. 19: pp. 2-3]
Gardner found that using existing inventory models
for this type of analysis was tedious and subject to a
large number of tr ial-and-error calculations with
respect to ordering, holding and shortage costs. Such
problems exist because existing Navy models seek to
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optimize costs for single items. To overcome this
deficiency, a Lagrangian optimization was formulated
which would minimize the number of requisitions for
which material was not available subject to investment
as well as workload constraints. The Lagrangian
multipliers corresponding to these constraints are
actually imputed marginal cost estimates that, when
used in existing models, yield the same results.
Exchange curves are developed by solving the model for
a range of workload constraints at a fixed investment
constraint. The appropriate investment in safety stock
is found at the point where the customer service goal
is achieved at the minimum number of orders. [Ref. 19:
pp. 3-4]
Once the appropriate safety stock level is
determined, the Lagrangian multipliers are used to
determine new cost variables yielding the appropriate
safety stock in the existing inventory model. During
the first year after this model was implemented at the
eight Naval Supply Centers, an overall reduction of
20.24 percent in material reorders (from 840,000 to
670,000 orders per year) was experienced, at a cost
savings of about $2 million. Customer service and
inventory investment remained constant. [Ref. 19: p.
5] This model should be evaluated by qualified
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personnel for use at naval shipyards in the
determination of Shop Stores inventory levels.
The most obvious action for the optimization of
Direct Material Inventory (DMI) is the use of
historical usage data, whenever possible, in the
determination of material requirements. Such action
minimizes the amount of material that is ordered and
placed in inventory but never used. Since the material
ordered and placed in the DMI account is requisitioned
based on relatively unique requirements, inventory
models such as previously discussed do not apply.
Several alternatives do exist, however, which will
reduce the overall investment in the DMI account.
Once work packages are written and the actual
material requirements are determined based on available
historical usage data, material should be sourced to
existing shipyard assets in the Shop Stores or
Unassigned Direct Material accounts. For the most
part, this action is already being effectively
performed. Shipyards have also begun to source
potential excess from the DMI account. Material which
cannot be sourced to existing assets should then be
segregated into standard stock (National Stock
Numbered) and non-standard stock categories. Utilizing
average turnaround times available in the Material
Management application of the shipyard management
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information system, standard stock requirements should
be matched against job order start dates and
requisitioned such that the material will arrive just
prior to the start of work. This practice has been
extremely successful throughout industry in recent
years under the name of "just-in-time" inventory
management. It should be noted, however, that
historical turnaround times do not exist for all
shipyard material requirements because not all standard
stock requisitions are repetitive procurement actions.
As a result, "just-in-time" procurement is not possible
for these items. If possible, average procurement
leadtimes for each item in this category should be
obtained from Navy stock points and utilized to
determine best estimates of procurement leadtimes for
shipyard requirements. This would permit the most
accurate application of "just-in-time" procurement for
non-repetitive standard stock requirements.
The requisitioning of non-standard material
presents several complications which, in effect,
require that this material be requisitioned far in
advance of the time that the material is actually
required. This material normally must be procured
under purchase contracts which often require up to six
months of administrative leadtime, followed by a
variable amount of production leadtime, before the
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material is ultimately shipped to the requistioner
.
Therefore, long-leadtime material must be procured far
in advance of other categories of material because of
potential shipyard production delays resulting from the
non-availability of this material. The need to start
the procurement process well in advance of the actual
material need date must be weighed against the cost of
holding the material for extended periods in the event
that material is received far in advance of the date
actually required. Estimates of administrative
leadtimes for procurement of identical or similar items
should be considered as much as possible in determining
the timing for the submission of procurement requests
in order to minimize the length of time that material
will be held prior to use.
The application of "just-in-time" inventory methods
assumes that extensive control over suppliers exists
such that material delivery dates are assured. Such
guarantees are not always possible under existing Navy
procurement methods, and as a result "just-in-time"
methods are seldom applied to non-standard
procurements. Where possible, shipyards should
establish long-term relationships with vendors for
"just-in-time" delivery of purchased material.
Material could be delivered in the minimum quantities
required to support production just prior to the times
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actually needed, even though the purchase contract
specifies a larger quantity over an extended period of
time. The additional costs of receipt processing
experienced under this philosophy should be compared to
the expected savings from decreased inventory carrying
costs before such agreements are made. Competitive
purchasing could still occur by dividing business among
several firms based on each firm's performance in
meeting "just-in-time" requirements.
The administrative leadtimes required to procure
material have increased in recent years primarily as a
result of congressional initiatives to increase
competition and support small or minority-owned
businesses. Although this policy is good for the
economy as a whole, longer leadtimes result in larger
inventory investments to support maintenance during the
longer procurement leadtime. This situation will
remain somewhat troublesome for purchasing activities
as well as for shipyards until circumstances permit the
relaxation of existing purchasing requirements.
Because it is in the public interest to use
competitive procurements as well as to support small
and minority-owned businesses, this situation is not
expected to change in the foreseeable future.
Goldratt and Fox [Ref . 20] have shown that a high
correlation exists between short leadtimes and high
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quality material. Shorter leadtimes are associated
with the production of smaller, more frequent batches
of material which are quality inspected earlier and
more often than are single, large "batches. The ability
to inspect material more frequently permits the early
discovery and correction of production errors and
contributes to enhanced product quality over time.
[Ref. 20: p. 65] Because product quality improves,
shipyards and purchasing activities should purchase
large total quantities of material to be delivered in
smaller lot-sizes at periodic intervals. Such action
will also reduce inventory carrying costs. The ability
to satisfy required leadtimes at reasonable product
cost should be a major criterion for vendor selection.
The importance of shorter leadtimes in the optimal
scheduling of purchase orders is discussed in more
detail by Ronen and Trietsch [Ref. 21].
Existing government procurement regulations and
procedures present several other difficulties which
impair the procurement of non-standard material.
Material descriptions for shipyard purchases are
normally limited to general performance specifications,
and cannot specify features that are unique to a
particular brand of material. Sole-source procurements
are prohibited unless it can be demonstrated that the
recommended source is the only firm capable of
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producing the required end-item. In addition,
competitive bidding must be used for all purchases
exceeding an extended value of $25,000. These actions
are intended to enhance competition as well as ensure
that the maximum number of firms are being awarded
government contracts. However, these regulations
frequently result in the receipt of material which
requires rework or alteration prior to use.
To ensure the receipt of the proper material as
well as to minimize the amount of rework required prior
to installation, procurement regulations should be
revised to permit the specification of form, fit and
function and, if available, the manufacturer's make,
model and part number. Sole-source procurement should
also be permitted for critical or highly technical
repair parts, when experience reveals that a single
firm is the only source capable of providing the
required material and when a single supplier has
demonstrated superior leadtime performance.
Purchase requests, particularly those which contain
extensive descriptions or instructions, are often
delayed because of the time required to process such
requests. Procurement personnel are evaluated based on
the number of procurement requests processed, and
individuals frequently set aside difficult, time-
consuming procurements in order to meet established
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performance quotas. Material requests containing
detailed descriptions are often processed only after
they are brought to the attention of management,
resulting in lost management time, longer procurement
leadtimes, higher material costs and late material
arrival. Performance measures should be revised to
include allowances for the longer times required to
process complex purchase requests.
The cost of purchase actions can be reduced through
the delay of purchases for small quantities of an item
until such time that a larger quantity can be procured.
This assumes that sufficient stock exists to meet
customer demand during the procurement period and
applies to joint purchases among shipyards as well as
purchases of DMI material (for several ships) within
single shipyards. Manufacturers and suppliers
frequently grant price breaks for larger quantities due
to the ability to minimize costs during larger
production runs. The grouping of requirements is best
performed at the material planning level, where the
ability exists to control document flow and determine
when entire quantities have been identified.
An alternative for the application of this
philosophy is to analyze historical usage data for
single line items on one or more ships, and then
generate bulk orders for future shipyard requirements.
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Material would then be allocated to various
requirements upon receipt.
The delay of purchases to achieve cost savings must
be weighed against the potential negative impact on
mission accomplishment, and procurement actions
prioritized in order to minimize mission degredation.
Cost savings resulting from quantity discount buys must
also be weighed against such costs as increased
investment costs, additional storage requirements,
increased manual procurement workloads, increased
administrative leadtimes, potential contract
termination costs, potential excess or long supply
inventory and shelf-life considerations.
Consideration should also be given to consolidating
purchase actions among several shipyards in order to
achieve purchase cost savings for high-cost, commonly
used items. Consolidated purchases should be made for
all orders exceeding an established dollar value, for
example all non-standard procurements exceeding $5,000.
Major candidates for joint procurement include
quantities of plate steel, bar stock and special
categories of material such as smoke-free electrical
cabling or other material subjected to unique quality
assurance requirements. Large lot-size purchases of
quality assurance material are particularly well suited
for this type of procurement, and additional cost
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savings could be realized during the receipt inspection
and testing of large groups of items.
The consolidation of purchases such that a single
purchase is made for all shipyards would possibly
result in even higher distribution costs, however, and
should not be attempted unless the savings are certain
to exceed the cost of material shipment. Consolidation
of purchases among shipyards should therefore be
limited to shipyards located in close proximity to
other shipyards (i.e., Puget Sound, Mare Island and
Long Beach Naval Shipyards on the west coast and
Portsmouth, Philadelphia, Norfolk and Charleston Naval
Shipyards on the east coast).
Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard should be included in
west coast shipyard procurements only when material for
that shipyard is typically obtained from outside
Hawaii, or when the savings gained exceed the
transportation costs required for delivery to Hawaii.
Initially, historical purchase data from each
shipyard could be obtained from the MM system and
consolidated at centralized procurement agencies on
each coast. The savings generated through increased
quantity discounts should also exceed the cost of
holding the larger quantities of material.
As previously addressed, the cost of holding
material is estimated to be 23 percent of the total
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value of inventory held. In order to minimize this
cost, as well as the dollar investment in inventory,
excess material should be kept to a minimum. In this
regard, material in the Unassigned Direct Material
(UDM) account should be limited to material for which a
future need can reasonably be determined. The decision
to transfer material from this account should be
evaluated considering the cost to hold and order
material as well as the potential costs incurred by not
having the material when needed. Material should be
returned to system stock to afford its use for other
purposes, or transferred to the Defense Property
Disposal Office (DPDO) in order that the government can
recoup at least a portion of the material value through
periodic sales.
It should be noted that, on average, shipyards
typically receive credit for only 23 percent of the
value of material items returned to system stock. This
occurs because excess assets (on-hand plus on-order)
often exist in the Navy supply system, and current
Naval Supply Systems Command policy awards credit only
for those assets turned-in which are in short supply.
This policy is currently being evaluated at NAVSUP, and
future action is expected which will result in
increased credit for assets turned-in.
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Currently, all stock returns in excess of $2,500
per line item are being reviewed, and credit given when
unawarded procurement contracts exist for those line
items. As a result of this situation, it is often
advantageous from the shipyards' standpoint to retain
material in the UDM account even though there is only a
slight possibility that the material will be used in
the future. NAVSUP should ensure that material returns
are consistently reviewed, and provide sufficient
incentives for shipyards to return excess material.
Such incentives could include the distribution of
shipyard excesses to non-Navy stock points. NAVSUP
should also periodically screen the Shipyard Material
Visibility System to identify shipyard excesses which
could be utilized by the supply system.
To coordinate the total material management effort,
shipyards should establish an organization to manage
the material planning and ordering functions under the
control of a single responsible individual. This
organization would be responsible for the overall
investment in inventory and would monitor the planning
of material requirements based on overall work
schedules. Comprehensive knowledge of material
requirements based on overall work schedules would
permit the reallocation of material from existing
assets to support current job orders, preventing the
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need to requisition and expedite the delivery of
material which exists in stock but is designated for
other jobs. Additional material, when required, would
then be requisitioned on a routine basis to arrive
prior to job order start dates for follow-on
availabilities. By using existing assets, material
inventories would be reduced through the minimization
of additional investments for material items that
currently exist in stock. Additional cost savings
would also be realized through fewer expediting actions
and smaller numbers of high-priority requisitions.
Such an organization was recommended by Coopers &
Lybrand to contain specific branches and sections with
specific functions, as listed below:
1
.
Master Scheduling . Long range ship availability
scheduling and workload forecasting.
2. Detailed Scheduling . Preparation of the Detailed
Production Schedule which serves as the basis for
establishing action dates for plan issue, long
leadtime material ordering, regular material
ordering and job order issue....
3. Availability Planning Branch . Ship availability
work package formulation and control ....
4. Specification Section . The preparation of job
order specification and craft manhour allowances.
5. Material Ordering Section . The identification
and ordering of all required material from the
documents prepared by the Specification
Section ....
6. Material Division . All productive work material
support functions of the Supply Department within
the shipyard, i.e., material procurement.
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expediting, receipt control, inventory control,
warehousing and distribution. [Ref. 16: p. MM-
8]
Coopers & Lybrand recommended that this
organization be consolidated under the shipyard
Planning Officer, similar to existing organizations at
the Type Commander level which combine engineering and
supply under a single Assistant Chief of Staff.
However, this consolidation could also occur under the
shipyard Supply Officer, as was implemented at Pearl
Harbor Naval Shipyard in late 1985 [Ref. 22: p. 48].
The Pearl Harbor organization, called the Logistic
Support Center, serves as the data base manager for Job
Material Lists and centrally manages advance material
planning and ordering. Its functions include obtaining
and maintaining current material planning data,
determining material requirements for authorized work
and providing complete and accurate data for
requisitioning material. The following specific
functions are assigned to the Logistic Support Center:
1. Updating the automated Job Material List system.
2. Determining and ordering advance material
requirements for authorized work and new work for
ships already in availability.
3. Making recommendations for "make-or-buy"
decisions.
4. Ensuring the timely ordering of material in




Researching and providing complete and accurate
data for sourcing against locally available
assets, requisitioning of standard stock material
and non-standard procurement actions.
Reviewing and resolving non-engineering type
technical issues including cost on referrals from
local purchase actions. [Ref . 22: p. 48]
Production department personnel should also have a
greater role in shipyard inventory management. As the
primary user of shipyard material, the production
department can identify potential support problems and
enhance material management efforts through the timely
return of unused material. Production shops should
routinely monitor material status to ensure that
required material is received prior to the date
actually required. When problems are identified, the
supply department should be notified that expediting
action is necessary. This early notification will
serve to minimize the number of high-priority
requisitions or special material shipments required to
ensure timely material delivery.
Ensuring that all required material is on-hand
prior to job order start would also minimize the number
of schedule delays or adjustments needed due to lack of
material. Production shops should also ensure that all
material issued to job orders, but unused, is returned
to stock as soon as possible after job order
completion. Excess material should not remain in
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production shops more than 30 days after job order
closure. Supervisors should be held responsible to
ensure that unused material is returned to stock in a
timely manner. Periodic spot checks of material in
production shops should be performed by an independent
party (i.e., Internal Review Office) to ensure that all
material is identified to a current job order.
G. SUMMARY
Although naval shipyard inventories have continued
to grow over the past five years, this growth is less
severe than experienced prior to that time. This
change is largely the result of increased management
attention regarding inventory management issues.
Historical usage data is utilized, where available, for
the determination of material requirements, and
material is being procured based on available
historical turnaround times. A major element in the
stabilization of inventory growth has been the
successful sourcing of material requirements to excess
material, which restricts additional investments in
inventory. Inventories have continued to grow
primarily as the result of policies which restricted
the transfer of material from the Unassigned Direct
Material account, combined with policies which prevent
the transfer of excess material from the DMI account at
the time of job order closure. Shipyards are able to
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source requirements to potential excess material in the
DMI account only on an exception basis.
NAVSEA has recently issued a policy statement in an
effort to correct inventory management deficiencies
previously identified by GAO and Coopers & Lybrand.
These revised policies establish performance goals for
the percentage of DMI ordered but not used, service
level and stock turn goals for the Shop Stores
Inventory and goals for the percentage of UDM utilized.
The requirement to have 100 percent of the material
required to support production prior to the start of
availabilities was eliminated. Each shipyard is
required to develop specific goals and procedures for
the management of the inventory accounts with the
overall goal being to improve inventory management.
Strengths and weaknesses of these policies were
addressed and recommendations for improvement were
provided.
Numerous alternatives remain which would serve to
reduce the investment in inventories below current
levels without affecting customer service or production
schedules. Safety stocks could be reduced,
particularly in the Shop Stores account, given the
availablity of material at nearby Navy stock points.
Direct Material could be purchased based on 30b order
start dates utilizing historical procurement leadtimes
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or stock point procurement lead-times when historical
data is not available. Existing purchase regulations
could be altered such that shipyards could specify
form, fit and function when writing purchase requests.
The cost of purchase actions could be reduced through
large quantity discount buys at individual activities
or through the consolidation of purchase actions among
several shipyards. The consolidation of the material
planning and ordering functions would provide
centralized management of the investment in inventory
and would streamline the process of material
reallocation among job orders. In addition, production
department personnel should assume a greater role in
the material management effort by ensuring that
material required delivery dates will be met, and by
returning unused material to the supply department in a
timely manner.
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VI. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY
The purpose of this thesis was to identify the
causes of inventory growth at naval shipyards and
identify possible material procurement and inventory
management alternatives which would serve to reduce the
future investment in shipyard inventories. Four basic





What are the contributory elements of shipyard
inventory growth in terms of physical
quantities as well as cost, and what is the
financial and managerial impact of this growth?
2. What is the effectiveness of the current data
base and management controls over acquisition,
requisition and disposition of inventory?
3. What changes in inventory management policies
could be implemented at naval shipyards to
reduce the size of inventories without
affecting overhaul schedules and support?
4. Is it cost effective to permit schedule changes
due to late material arrival?
These questions were answered on the basis of data
obtained from related background literature, detailed
analysis of prior studies of shipyard inventory
management problems, analysis of current shipyard
inventory management data and personal (telephone)
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interviews with individuals responsible for inventory
management decisions.
Material inventories at naval shipyards have
increased 18.37 percent, from $518.7 million to $614
million, over the past five years. This increase in
inventory value is the result of many factors,
including increases in the complexity and costs of
repair parts, the inability to transfer excess
materials due to restrictive policies and the
requirement to obtain and hold 100 percent of the
material required for an availability prior to the
start of the availability. Contributing to this growth
are poorly defined technical data and purchasing
requirements which prevent requisitioner s from
specifying required procurement sources. Both of these
latter factors frequently result in the receipt of
material which is not functional and requires
substantial rework prior to use.
A major contributor to this problem is the lack of
coordination between the materials planning and
ordering functions which are performed by separate
departments within the shipyard command structure.
This lack of coordination results in unnecessary
investments in inventory when identical material
already exists but is restricted to other uses. These
problems become more severe as inventory levels
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continue to increase subject to fiscal limitations
which are necessary in a climate of federal budget
deficits and mandatory budget reductions at the
activity level.
Inventory growth is not necessarily a problem
because the complexity and value of ships undergoing
overhaul and repair increase over time. In fact, some
inventory growth is to be expected due to the increased
complexity of repair parts (such as electronic modules)
as well as inflationary factors which cause the cost of
material to rise. However, the failure to use accurate
planning data, including historical material usage
factors, enhances the investment in inventory.
Inventory management in any organization the size and
scope of naval shipyards will never be perfect, and
some material shortages and surpluses will always exist
due to unforeseen maintenance requirements and the
cancellation of previously scheduled work.
Revised inventory management policies were issued
by the Commander , Naval Sea Systems Command in February
1988 in an effort to correct numerous inventory
management deficiencies identified by the U.S. General
Accounting Office and the accounting firm Coopers &
Lybrand. These policies require that shipyards develop
material handling procedures and methods to reduce
inventory inaccuracies, and establish internal controls
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for the documentation of material from the time of
receipt to the time of issue.
Shipyards must also establish programs to improve,
as well as maintain, inventory accuracy. Specific
inventory accuracy goals for each inventory account
were established to be achieved over the next three
years. Reporting requirements for inventory management
performance were also provided. Although the revised
policies are a positive first-step toward reducing the
investment in shipyard inventories, they are deficient
in several respects.
For example, shipyards were not provided sufficient
guidance regarding the extent to which new methods or
procedures should be developed, nor were timeframes
provided for required implementation. In addition,
shipyards were directed to establish goals for the
utilization of material in the UDM account, but were
not provided specific goals concerning the extent to
which this inventory account should be reduced under
normal conditions (such as 15 percent reduction per
year through 1992). Specific strengths and weaknesses
for these revised policies were addressed and
recommendations for improvement were provided.
Many additional changes could be made to existing
inventory management policies which would reduce the
size of inventories without adversely affecting
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overhaul schedules and support. As discussed in this
thesis, overhaul schedules have been met through the
shifting of individual job orders within the overall
schedule in order to meet specific key events for
overhaul completion. Because these recommendations are
expected to increase material availability through more
accurate requirements determination, the need to
reschedule individual job order completion dates should
decrease. However, the potential to shift job orders
due to lack of material would always exist, and
conditions for overhaul completion would be no worse
than under existing policies. The ability to delay
overhaul schedules due to lack of material is
considered cost prohibitive due to the impact on future
overhaul and repair work, given limited shipyard
facilities and the need to have fixed numbers of ships
deployed or in a deployable status at all times.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Numerous recommendations for improving inventory
management within naval shipyards have been proposed by
the General Accounting Office and Coopers & Lybrand as
the result of their individual studies. The
recommendations of those studies, as well as those
proposed below, are consistent in the identification of
actions that should be taken at naval shipyards to
improve inventory management. Additional
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recommendations are provided and emphasized based on
information that has become available since the
conclusion of the GAO and Coopers & Lybrand studies.
The benefits derived from the implementation of any or
all of these recommendations are expected to exceed any
dollar cost incurred, and will contribute to smaller
investments in material inventories.
The following actions are recommended to improve
inventory management at naval shipyards:
1 . MATERIAL PROCUREMENT ;
a. Continue to utilize historical usage data,
when available, for determining material
requirements. Segregate standard stock
requirements from non-standard requirements,
requisitioning standard stock requirements prior
to job order start dates based on historical
average requisition turnaround times. Obtain
Navy stock point average turnaround times for use
in those instances where shipyard data is not
available. When possible, order standard stock
material for direct delivery to the requiring
shop. Order non-standard requirements in advance
of 30b order start dates based on historical or
expected procurement leadtimes in those instances
where delivery dates are certain.
b. Revise procurement policies to permit
shipyards to specify form, fit and function as
well as manufacturer's make, model and part
number. This will ensure that only required
material is procured as well as minimize the
amount of rework required prior to the
installation of material and equipment.
Requirements for competitive bidding and sole-
source procurements should also be revised to
permit the direct purchase of critical or highly
technical repair parts from the original
manufacturer. Sole-source procurement should
also be permitted when a single supplier is known
to be the only existing manufacturer of the
required material and when a single supplier has
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demonstrated superior leadtime performance.
Because procurement personnel are currently
evaluated based strictly on the number of
purchase transactions performed, changes should
be implemented to ensure that difficult
transactions are not indefinitely set aside.
Such measures might include criteria for various
types of transactions which provide allowances
for the longer time required to process complex
transactions
.
c. Develop a system wherein joint purchases among
several shipyards can occur for high-cost
material exceeding an established dollar value
and for all purchases where price breaks may be
obtained for quantity discount buys. The costs
of such action should be weighed against the
potential benefits, and joint purchases made only




a. Ensure that periodic physical inventories are
performed as required, and that inventory records
are updated based on verified physical inventory
results
.
b. Establish effective procedures to ensure the
proper and timely assignment of material to the
Unassigned Direct Material account. Assignment
of material to UDM should occur at job order
closure, and be limited to material which
historically has long procurement leadtimes, are
high-cost, require special manufacture or for
which the shipyard is the sole or principal
demand source. Standard stock material should be
returned to system stock unless a potential
future need can be demonstrated, and then
returned to system stock at the end of the
required minimum holding period.
c. Establish specific performance goals for
requisitioning and inventory management
performance and hold managers responsible to meet
those goals. Such goals should include the
percentage of high-priority requisitions
submitted due to improper requirements
determination, specific goals for the percentage
reduction of the existing UDM inventory and
specific goals for the percentage of UDM
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utilized. Penalties should be imposed when such
goals are not consistently met.
d. Revise the requirement that Shop Stores
material be retained as demand-based on the basis
of one demand in a 36 month period. A criterion
such as one demand in a 1 2 month period would be
more conducive to the reduction of the size and
value of the Shop Stores account. Material could
be transferred to the UDM account at the end of
the 12 month period, held for the permissible 24
months and be available for production support
during that period. Unused UDM would then be
transferred or otherwise disposed of at the end
of the maximum UDM holding period. The long-term
impact of this action would be to reduce the Shop
Stores inventory as well as return material to
system stock earlier than under existing
policies
.
e. Lower the existing Shop Stores service level
goal to 90 percent at all shipyards except
Portsmouth Naval Shipyard. The Shop Stores
inventory consists mostly of stock-numbered items
which are usually available at Navy stock points.
By relying on stock points for backup stocks,
inventory levels can be reduced with minimal
impact on customer support. Portsmouth Naval
Shipyard is excluded because it is not located
near a major supply activity. If this lower
service level goal is achieved with negligible
impact on production support, it might be lowered
even further in the future. The ability to rely
on backup stocks at Navy stock points assumes
that the supply system will continue to operate
at high service levels.
f
.
Develop specific decision rules for the
transfer or disposal of material from the UDM
account. Specific decision rules are required to
ensure that shipyard inventory managers make
correct, timely decisions for the transfer or
disposal of material assigned to this account.
g. Evaluate the Gardner model for use in the
determination of Shop Stores inventory levels,
and determine if this model might be applicable
to other shipyard inventory accounts. If
inventory levels and safety stocks can be reduced
with negligible impact on mission accomplishment
such that the overall benefit derived exceeds the
cost of implementation, the model should be
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implemented for the management of the Shop Stores
or other inventory accounts. Personnel with
experience and training in the use and
implementation of mathematical inventory models
should be relied on throughout evaluation and
implementation efforts.
h. Establish an organization responsible for the
overall investment in inventory to include the
planning and ordering functions. This
organization should monitor the planning of
material requirements based on overall work
schedules as well as reallocate material from
existing assets to support current job orders.
Other responsibilities would include making
recommendations for "make-or-buy" decisions,
ensuring the timely ordering of material in
accordance with published plans and ordering
schedules, as well as researching and providing
complete and accurate data for sourcing against
locally available assets, requisitioning of
standard stock material and non-standard
procurement actions.
i. Establish procedures to ensure that material
required delivery dates are monitored at the
production shop level, and advance follow-up
action is performed to ensure material delivery
prior to job order start. Such action would
serve to minimize current expediting efforts,
including special ordering and shipment of
material, as well as delays caused by lack of
material
.
3 . Establish procedures and controls to ensure
that unused material issued to production shops
is returned to stock when it is determined that
the material will not be required for production
support. Materials actually used in production
should be routinely matched to job orders, and
shop supervisors held responsible to ensure that
unused material is returned to stock within
specified timeframes after job completion.
3. EXCESS MATERIAL ;
a. Transfer all excess Shop Stores material to
the UDM account for greater visibility as part of
the Shipyard Material Visibility System. This
action would ensure that the material is
identified as excess to the holding shipyard's
current needs. In addition, the size of the Shop
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stores account would be reduced by the amount of
the excess material, making Shop Stores
management (including physical inventories) much
easier and less costly.
b. Continue the development of a centralized data
bank that contains a record of all material
assigned to the various shipyard UDM accounts,
inactive and excess Shop Stores items and
material assigned to DMI Category Four.
Shipyards should then utilize this data bank to
fill material requirements prior to the
initiation of non-standard procurement requests
or high-cost standard stock requisitions. In all
cases, the cost to transfer the material to the
requesting shipyard should be compared to the
cost to procure that same material (including the
dollar cost of the material purchased) as well as
the implied cost of potential delays resulting
from the lack of material. Material should be
transferred when the transfer cost is less than
the costs of procurement and production delays.
c. NAVSUP should adjust its existing material
returns policy to ensure that shipyards have
sufficient incentive to return excess material to
system stock. In addition to reviewing all stock
returns in excess of $2,500, NAVSUP should
coordinate the return of material, such as
material managed by the Defense Logisitics Agency
( DLA ) , to the DLA for distribution to DLA storage
sites or to other military services. NAVSUP
should also periodically screen the Shipyard
Material Visibility System to identify shipyard
excesses which could be utilized by the supply
system.
C. FURTHER RESEARCH
Further research is required regarding the
availability and applicability of new models for the
determination of shipyard inventory levels. Such
models should consider the availability of backup
stocks within the Navy supply system as well as limits
for the overall investment in inventory. Models
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tailored to shipyard requirements are unavailable, yet
necessary, due to the unique procurement relationships
between naval shipyards and the various sources, both
military and civilian, from which material is obtained.
The research required to develop such models is best
performed by individuals experienced in the development
of mathematical inventory models.
Additional research should also be directed at the
material rejection rates that exist for shipyard
material. Although rejection rates have decreased in
recent years, the (current) rejection of 11.1 percent
of all material purchased is higher than material
rejection rates experienced by civilian shipyards. The
author believes that this situation is a combination of
improper material standards, poorly written purchase
specifications, improper vendor selection and perhaps
improper receipt inspections. A detailed study in this
area could lead to corrective action which would reduce
the investment in material that is not suitable for
use
.
Once the recommendations of this and other studies
have been implemented, a follow-on study should be
conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of these
measures. Corrective action and additional
alternatives for improvement should be identified and
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